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Abstract 
Feminist challenges to the traditional principles of vicarious liability, and their application in 
practice, highlight the difficulties that face claimants seeking redress via a doctrine largely 
developed from claims relating to the corporate model, and reflecting masculine traits of 
institutional power and control embedded in the traditional company employer/employee 
relationship. This article explores the ways in which the recent spate of claims made against 
UK religious authorities in respect of present and historic acts of child sexual abuse 
perpetrated by the clergy have forced a paradigm shift requiring the courts to consider 
influences on the legal process associated with tropes such as restorative justice, powerfully 
supported and explained by feminist legal theorists. The position of the Roman Catholic 
Church, however, is shown to be very different to that of the Church of England, highlighting 
the need for the paradigm shift to go further and to consider the role of validation and 
vindication as elements in reparation, institutional as well as individual. 
 
Keywords; vicarious liability, child sexual abuse, clergy abuse, restorative justice, harm 
vindication 
 
Introduction 
Accusations of child sexual abuse perpetrated by figures of religious authority have become 
public over the past three decades in England. Initially focus was on the Roman Catholic 
Church but the revelations have increasingly included Protestant denominations. The 
accusations made in respect of Roman Catholic clergy precipitated a number of complex 
civil law claims against their respective ‘employers’. In turn this highlighted powerful 
challenges, particularly from feminist perspectives, to existing thought on tort doctrine and 
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remedies. Notably, these have included ideas relating to restorative justice approaches.2 
Judgments have revealed considerable movement in legal guidelines in relation to vicarious 
liability and limitation periods. The UK courts have now established in principle that the 
Roman Catholic Church has responsibility for its priests as ‘employees’, but this has not yet 
been successfully extended to the Protestant churches in England, despite the official 
acceptance by them of the actuality of extensive incidents of historical child sexual abuse 
practised by some of their priests.  
 
Considering the Anglican reality, reparative gestures have been made by the Church of 
England, including a public apology from the Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, 
endorsed by the Synod.3 But official guidelines do not reference any form of reparation to 
match the levels of remorse expressed other than offers of spiritual support. The issue 
explored by this article is what this acceptance of moral responsibility actually means in 
terms of the legal liability of the Anglican Church for English claimants. This has wider 
implications for other Protestant churches.4 The current situation regarding the Church of 
England raises the question of what the priorities are for victims of such abuse when seeking 
vindication and associated reparation.5 Does (can) the traditional remedy of financial 
compensation proffer sufficient reparation? The need for harm vindication, expressed 
through strategies such as the public ‘validatory’ airing of the less tangible (and quantifiable) 
consequences of abuse claims via the court system, has been central to the challenges to 
legal thought posed by feminist scholars like Kathleen Daly.6 The recent overturning by an 
Independent Review of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ decision not to prosecute Lord 
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Janner on historic child sexual abuse charges suggests that the legal and political 
establishment are responding to these, but what of the churches?7 In line with harm 
vindication principles, public apologies are being freely offered by the churches but can 
apology alone ever be a sufficient reparative response?8 This discussion utilises feminist 
legal theory to reflect on the responsibility of these spiritual institutions with specific 
reference to claims of vicarious liability as the primary civil law mechanism for holding 
organizations to account. .  
 
1 Synthesizing Feminist Legal Theory and Vicarious Liability in the Context of Clergy 
Abuse 
For over 20 years, feminist scholars including Leslie Bender, Patricia Peppin and Josephine 
Donovan have argued that the application of tortious principles, traditionally presented as 
‘neutral and unbiased’, should properly take into account issues highlighted by wider feminist 
perspectives including the implications of the inherent language of law for justice delivery.9 
Peppin claims that the fundamental negligence concepts of harm, duty and standard of care 
‘need to be construed in a manner sensitive to historic disadvantage’.10 Since the typically 
masculine traits of hierarchy and dominance both ‘disadvantage [and] characterise 
relationships in life’, then a corresponding ‘awareness of this dimension should enter into the 
determination of liability and compensation.’11 Bender argues:  
 ‘Tort law needs to be more of a system of response and caring.... Its focus should be 
 on interdependence and collective responsibility rather than on individuality, and on 
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 safety and help for the injured rather than on “reasonableness” and economic 
 efficiency.’12   
Her espousal of the concept of ‘retort’ is illuminating, partly as in the sense of a 
conversational response to legal theory and judicial practice; but also as a theoretical device, 
to reconceptualise and reconstruct the application of tortious liability through feminist legal 
method.13 Like Daly, she insists that a full remedy of harms would require consideration of  
the ‘physical, emotional, and interpersonal losses or "costs" inflicted upon particular 
individuals, and the continued, dangerous decision making potential of the errant 
corporation’.14 In other words, if it is to fulfil its supposed legal function, which includes as 
strategic aims both deterrence and compensation, tort law must recognise emotional, 
physical and spiritual harms.  Along with Daly’s framing reflections on harm vindication and 
the need for validation in achieving justice, Bender’s ground-breaking, and in the context of 
sexual abuse claims, prescient, feminist critique of tort law provides the basis for our 
subsequent focus on what has been achieved, and what challenges remain. Her critical 
themes of equality, responsibility, remedy and alternative legal strategies are also employed 
to reflect on the extent to which judicial reasoning in the leading cases reviewed here relates 
to the challenges posed by such critiques.15  
 
For Carol Gilligan as well as Daly, questions of morality from a feminist perspective focus 
upon ‘context…relationships, equity, and responsibility’; with interconnectedness as a 
defining characteristic of a relationship rather than the quintessentially hierarchical 
conceptualisations of more conventional male perspectives.16 Furthermore, tortious 
remedies should not be limited to financial compensation but should recognise and 
accommodate other means of reparation; something which could include public 
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acknowledgement of instances of abuse, via court hearings, as well as apologies. As 
Conaghan has commented, ‘over the last few decades feminists have been at the vanguard 
of boundary changes to tort liability, particularly in relation to claims deriving from 
sexual…harm’.17 Certainly the criticisms in such scholarship are fundamental to 
understanding the implications of changes in the practices in the English courts in the last 
quarter-century, particularly in the re-visitation of vicarious liability in recent judicial reasoning 
in relation to the Roman Catholic Church. But the question remains of where this leaves the 
Church of England.  
 
Under the Salmond Test, vicarious liability is a device whereby a party may become liable 
for the tort of another. Strictly speaking both parties remain defendants, although for 
practical purposes, most usually related to the ability of one (deeper pocket) defendant to 
assume liability, there will be only one party held liable.18 The traditional doctrinal approach 
was to locate that arrangement within a defined employment, or master and servant, 
relationship. Society and the law have moved beyond such linguistic and conceptual 
antiquity, preferring a contemporary reading of vicarious liability. This involves 
reconsideration of the extent of the connections that cement the relationship between the 
two defendants; the actual tortfeasor and the legal person deemed responsible.19  
 
The traditional perspective effectively debarred such judicial consideration until the leading 
judgment in Caparo in 1990, which imported notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ to accompany 
the ‘reasonable’ when determining the existence of a general duty of care, with the 
implications that had for vicarious liability.20 The broadening of the Salmond test, identified 
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from the start as imprecise and necessarily requiring pragmatism,21 provides the first 
evidence of a shift from the traditional doctrinal strait-jacketing towards justice mechanisms 
more in line with harm vindication concepts. A decade later, this underpinned the House of 
Lords’ judgment in Lister v Hesley Hall 2001. Lord Millet held that ‘an employer who is not 
personally at fault is made legally answerable for the fault of his employee’ where an 
inextricable link could be established between wrongful acts and the employment involved, 
in this case, sexual abuse of children by staff.22 Recent UK Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal decisions dealing with abuse claims against the clergy suggest that the judiciary are 
regularly exhibiting the levels of awareness highlighted by Peppin in relation to cases 
involving the Roman Catholic Church. This has included a more generous interpretation of 
vicarious liability targeting those with the means to finance compensation for victim claimants. 
It ensures that if an ‘employer’ has created risk through, broadly, an employment relationship, 
they should be expected to be vicariously liable if that risk transpires.23 Per Lord Phillips in 
the Catholic Child Welfare case, ‘it is fair, just and reasonable’ for vicarious liability to be 
shared with the employing school by an institute of the Catholic Church, given that the abuse 
was committed by Catholic monks.24 In the context of the emphasis elsewhere on restorative 
justice in the last quarter-century, a greater willingness of victims to come forward in these 
cases has manifested itself. This has enabled courts to make a paradigm shift where 
contextual factors identified as crucial to a vindication of hurt felt and indicative of a betrayal 
of the duty of care are positively considered when applying the principles of vicarious 
liability.25 Such broadening of responsibility would not necessarily have been achieved but 
for the framing factor provided by the distinctive factors presented in these cases, alongside 
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the non-corporate structure of religious institutions and the relatively uncomplicated legal 
nature of the non-established Roman Catholic Church in the UK.26  
 
This contrasts with the complexities surrounding the legal position of the established Church 
of England. It leaves it open to question how far, in practice, the redrawn vicarious liability 
concept can be utilised successfully to deal with all cases involving clerical sexual abuse of 
children. The failure, to date, to bring any case against the Church of England as an 
institution, despite a number of convictions of individual clergy on abuse charges,27 suggests 
that a sole reliance on the vicarious liability doctrine may not be sufficient to permit the 
delivery of what victims would see as ‘justice’ and an appropriate recompense for the harm 
done to them.  
 
Despite the advances noted, an essentially traditional fixation on monetary compensation as 
the principal remedy for harm continues to dominate. In practice, in most instances where 
tortious liability is proven, financial compensation is the inevitable outcome as opposed to 
other forms of ‘corrective justice’.28 But Honore argues that a tortfeasor’s accountability as 
an ‘outcome responsibility’ is broader than any moral blame or legal liability and one that 
‘figures prominently in our sense of our own agency and is important for both the theory of 
agency and moral theory.’29 This could be used radically to challenge the issue of where 
responsibility lies in moral terms: thereby theoretically having the potential to make religious 
institutions, including the Church of England, consider to what extent moral responsibility 
should be practically recognised by them, especially given their avowed objective of working 
to repair the harm done to individuals in the Anglican communion by clerical abusers.30  
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2 Vicarious Liability and the Roman Catholic Church 
In considering the peculiar legal position of the Church of England, a review of the 
development of the legal doctrine of vicarious liability in relation to the Roman Catholic 
Church needs to be undertaken to understand why the option of bringing such claims has 
not similarly been applied to the Church of England. When, in 1850, the Roman Catholic 
ecclesiastical hierarchy was re-established in the UK for the first time since the Reformation, 
care was taken to ensure that it was placed on a very different legal basis to the Church of 
England. The reasoning was to prevent any claims for restoration of ecclesiastical property, 
from churches to land, formerly in the possession of the Roman Catholic Church.31 
Consequently, in the late twentieth century, when individual perpetrators began to be 
convicted, lawyers believing that the Roman Catholic Church in England could be held to 
account, as well as the guilty men, cannot simply presume the same would apply to the 
Anglican Church.  
 
In January 2012, Sean O’Neill, the Crime Editor at The Times, published a list of 31 named 
Roman Catholic priests convicted of child sex offences in the English courts between 2008 
and 2011. In addition an unknown number received police cautions.32 Disclosure of the scale 
of abuse was a factor in the willingness of concerned legal practitioners to pursue vicarious 
liability claims, not simply for financial recompense but as a way of achieving validatory 
public acknowledgment of harm done by persons with a moral as well as a secular duty of 
care. Richard Scorer, senior partner at Pannone LLP, is reported as stating that at any one 
time over 30 civil cases involving clerical abuse claims were being handled by lawyers. In 
Scorer’s view the Roman Catholic Church’s policies and procedures have improved since 
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the 2001 Nolan Review on Child Protection in the Catholic Church in England and Wales.33 
However, he has cautioned that the full extent of the clerical abuse has yet to be uncovered; 
something he accounts for by reference to Canon 490 of the Code of Canon Law, which 
requires each bishop to maintain a secret and secure document archive.34 Also militating 
against the assumption that the Church is moving towards an acknowledgment of the need 
for reparation for abuse, as O’Neill highlights, compensation awards secured against the 
Catholic Church have been relatively small, typically £10-20,000. After all, the ‘Church often 
deploys expensive lawyers and complex arguments to resist claims’ in the courts, prioritising 
the maintenance of its assets over restorative justice to victims.35  
 
Pope Francis appears to be seeking to change this. He has unequivocally acknowledged 
that Roman Catholic clergy have been guilty of abuse and issued an apology.36  He has also 
acknowledged that there is still a reluctance by the local Catholic hierarchy in many 
countries to abandon its secrecy and engage in positive and public negotiations in the 
interest of harm vindication, via the courts, with victims.37 A continuing preference for 
negotiated financial settlements before court hearings is disturbing given that victims are 
often less concerned about financial outcomes than with gaining a public airing for their 
claims through the courts, as a means of achieving validation of their sufferings. In 2004, 
former altar boy Simon Grey was the beneficiary of what is generally identified as the first 
substantive out of court settlement agreed by the Catholic Church in the UK. Abused 
between 1975 and 1981 by Father Christopher Clonan at Christ the King Church, Coventry, 
Grey brought proceedings against the Birmingham Archdiocese for breach of their duty of 
care. Just before the High Court hearing the Archdiocese offered £300,000 in settlement 
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which Grey accepted. However, in subsequent media interviews, Grey made it clear that he 
felt he had not benefitted from harm vindication:  
 ‘I would have liked to have my case heard in open court, but pursuing that principle 
 could have cost me money and my sanity. I suffered serious abuse and that was 
 what this was about: my abuse and others' abuse.’38 
 
In 2005, though, Clonan’s actions were finally exposed in the courts. The High Court in 
Manchester awarded £635,684 (the largest sum to date) to claimant A, who was abused by 
Clonan between 1977 and 1988, starting when A, the child of devoted Catholics who had 
welcomed Clonan into their home, was aged 7.39 Implicitly acknowledging a quasi-restorative 
justice dimension to the case, Justice Clarke commented that as a regular visitor to the 
home Clonan was ‘trusted and admired. The abuse was the grossest breach of the trust that 
A and his family had placed in him.’40 As a child A had not understood what was happening 
and then had become too scared to speak out, fearing he would not be believed The judge’s 
direct acknowledgement of harm done therefore amounted to an appropriate vindication 
accompanying the more traditional financial compensation.41 Equally, the award was not 
challenged by the Church. Belief that it had a positive impact on victims is supported by the 
fact that another of Clonan’s victims came forward seeking validation via the courts.42 
 
Clonan had paid Maga (an epileptic 12 year-old non-Catholic boy with severe learning 
difficulties) small sums of money for odd jobs and invited him to attend discos at the church. 
There he had been abused by Clonan in the presbytery. Represented by the Official Solicitor, 
Maga claimed the trustees were vicariously liable for Clonan’s abuse and negligent in not 
following up a number of allegations, including one made in 1974 by the parents of another 
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boy to Clonan’s immediate supervisor, Father McTernan. The trustees’ response argued not 
only that the claim was time-barred but also that they were not vicariously liable as Clonan’s 
actions were not ‘closely connected’ to his ‘employment.’ Lord Neuberger MR found 
common ground between the Church and other professions and corporate entities. Father 
Clonan normally dressed in his clerical ‘uniform’. This denoted his position of trust and 
responsibility and intensified his moral authority. His ‘duty’ to evangelise extended to 
Catholics and non-Catholics alike, he was also given specifically assigned responsibility to 
engage with young people (grooming Maga under the guise of performing his pastoral duties) 
which: 
 ‘gave him the status and opportunity to draw the claimant further into his sexually 
 abusive orbit by ostensibly respectable means connected with his employment as a 
 priest at the Church.’43 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal determined, importantly, that the claim was not time-barred 
because of the ruling in Hoare (discussed below). However, it also held that the defendants 
were not vicariously liable on the grounds that Conan’s association was not part of any 
evangelisation, therefore he was not carrying out any priestly duties. 
 
In a further challenge to progressive reasoning, O’Sullivan has expressed concern that 
understandings of vicarious liability have been ‘driven by unusual, extreme situations 
hovering around its edge, because only with a clearly defined edge can we be sure what 
forms the core of the rule.’44 Her assertion that vicarious liability ‘is being shaped and defined 
by cases involving child abuse, miles away from its bread and butter function of making 
commercial employers pay for the negligence of their employees’ reveals an ongoing 
reluctance by some in the English court system to move vicarious liability thinking forward.45 
Fortunately, others accept that evolution of legal concepts and principles does depend upon 
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boundary shifts, and a degree of flexibility to accommodate new realities. Concepts of 
‘employment’ are usefully more fluid than in previous generations and provision of services 
increasingly exists outside of normal commercial contexts. It is therefore appropriate that the 
law reflects the contemporary landscape. A close connection test potentially enables a 
positive outcome, in that a greater emphasis is placed on an ‘employer’ to ensure effective 
oversight or supervision of an employee.    
 
This evolution of tort law is often a creation of policy factors and in that context the 
desirability of a ‘clearly defined edge’ was addressed in the Court of Appeal by Lord Justice 
Ward in JGE v The Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust. This laid 
the basis for a seminal Supreme Court decision later that year, E v English Province of Our 
Lady of Charity.46 The claimant’s case was that Father Wilfred Baldwin, appointed by the 
Portsmouth Diocese, raped her when she was 7 years-old and living in a Roman Catholic 
children’s home run by an order of nuns. The defendants, Our Lady of Charity, were the 
order and trustees of a trust which had stood in the place of the diocesan bishop at the 
material time. The defendants claimed that their relationship with the priest was not 
analogous to an employer/employee relationship as there was no written employment 
contract. As priests were appointed verbally, the Bishop had no authority to supervise, only 
advise; no wages were paid by the diocese and priests could not be dismissed except by the 
Pope. While Father Baldwin owed the Bishop obedience he was free to conduct himself and 
his ministry as he wished and was only answerable to the canon law. Two of the judges at 
the Court of Appeal (Ward and Davis LLJ) held that there was a close connection between 
the tortfeasor and the defendant.47 Their relationship was ‘so close in character’ to that of an 
employee and employer that it was ‘just and fair’ to hold the defendant liable because of the 
extent to which the priest was integrated into the structure of the church and the centrality of 
his role. Ward concluded that vicarious liability is a fluid concept that needs to be determined 
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in context.48 Here that context was the seriousness of the sexual abuse, which has 
‘emphatically moved beyond the confines of a contract of service.’49 He stressed on more 
than one occasion that liability should only be fixed where it is ‘just and fair’ to hold the 
defendant vicariously liable tempering Kidner’s clearly patriarchal tests which follow the 
orthodoxy of control, integration, organisation and entrepreneur.50 
 
Ward concluded by briefly reviewing some of the main themes of vicarious liability: control, 
compensation, deterrence, loss-spreading and enterprise liability.51 This echoes Bender in 
that it established a position that there is ‘no single rationale that provides a complete 
answer for the imposition of vicarious liability’ and that the courts rarely ‘speak with one 
voice.’52 On the one hand, his position reflects Fleming’s Law of Torts that ‘the modern 
doctrine of vicarious liability … should be frankly recognised in having its basis in a 
combination of policy considerations.’53 It also reflects McLachlin J’s comment in the 
Canadian case of Bazley v Curry:  
 ‘a focus on policy is not to diminish the importance of legal principle…. However, in 
 areas of jurisprudence where changes have been occurring in response to policy 
 considerations, the best route to enduring principle may well lie through policy.’54  
 
On the other, it acknowledges Lord Hobhouse’s criticism of McLachlin’s ‘social and 
economic reasons’ in Lister, where Hobhouse made it clear that ‘the exposition of the policy 
reasons for a rule is not the same as defining the criteria for its application.’55 Weighing up 
both approaches Ward undeniably acknowledges that policy considerations do and should 
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inform legal principles provided they are ‘developed incrementally and in a principled way’.56 
This chimes with feminist perspectives on the need to adopt a more modern and sensitive 
approach to vicarious liability. The policy dimension has been well expressed in the UK 
Supreme Court by Lord Phillips.57 The ‘defined edge’, comes with Phillips’ observation that 
‘the policy objective underlying vicarious liability is to ensure, insofar as it is fair, just and 
reasonable, that liability for tortious wrong is borne by a defendant with the means to 
compensate the victim’.58 
 
The moral balance influencing the Supreme Court’s conclusions in the Birmingham 
Archdiocesan appeal in the Maga case references the largest claim against the Roman 
Catholic Church, made by Patrick Raggett.59 A city lawyer, he had been regularly abused 
over a four year period by a teacher at the Jesuit Catholic College he had attended in the 
1970s. Raggett sought £5 million in compensation after suffering a breakdown in 2005 and 
suddenly remembering that Father Michael Spencer had abused him, touching his genitals 
and performing digital anal penetration. Spencer had died in 2000, aged 76, but Raggett 
sued the Governors of the College, who denied liability on the basis that the claim was time-
barred as it had not been brought within three years of Raggett’s 18th birthday as per section 
11 Limitation Act 1980. However, in the High Court, Mrs Justice Swift directed that the 
section 11 bar should not apply, being satisfied with Raggett’s claim of suppressed memory 
accounting for the delay.60 She followed the 2008 House of Lords decision in A v Hoare, a 
set of conjoined appeals.61 The House of Lords held that for compensation claims for 
personal injury in cases of historic sexual abuse, time ran (under section 14 of the Act) from 
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when the claimant had knowledge of the necessary facts of any abuse, not from when he or 
she could have been expected to take certain steps to report the original abuse.62  
 
While Mrs Justice Swift agreed that not all the problems of Raggett’s adult life were a 
consequence of the abuse, she emphasised that as ‘the victim of an insidious form of abuse 
involving a grave breach of trust’ he had ‘suffered significantly’ and in so doing, provided his 
claim with a level of validation in line with that he was seeking, as his own comments make 
plain.63 Raggett was scathing of the Church’s responses and the ongoing breach of trust that 
represented for him: 
 ‘The most important aspect of this trial is that the people who allowed this to happen 
 – and who were quite happy to see it swept under the carpet – have been held 
 responsible at last.…For all the warm words from the Jesuit order about co-
 operating in this case, the reality is they fought it tooth and nail without regard for my 
 feelings.… the Catholic Church generally, is still not accepting legal and moral 
 responsibility for the dark virus of abuse in the way it should.’ 64 
This once again returns the focus to the feminist critiques of vicarious liability as traditionally 
conceived, and the argument that for the law to work effectively, it must work in a social 
context that acknowledges the need for changes in how institutions perceive their 
responsibility for offenders as well as for victims.  
 
3 ‘Equality-before-the-law’ and religious institutions 
Bender insists that  
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 ‘Accompanying our ideology of equality-before-the-law is an expectation that the 
 judge and legal process somehow will intervene, if necessary, to balance the unequal 
 power between the parties, so that justice can prevail.’
 65 
 
Such power dynamics can and should not simply be ignored or dismissed because the 
autonomy of the law privileges more objective and universal principles. There has been 
discernible movement. Claims for intentional sexual assault (trespass against the person) 
once fell within the breach of duty category,66 but in Stubbings v Webb67 (concerning a claim 
of sexual abuse committed over 20 years before) the House of Lords ruled that such cases 
were now excluded from sections 11, 14 and 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 which, in 
combination, had previously permitted such claims. Burton confirms that Stubbings 
‘produced severe distortions in the lower courts who attempted to distinguish it on grounds 
which created both anomalies and complexity.’68 Claimants of historic abuse were now 
required to prove that defendant organisations had been ‘systematically negligent’ in failing 
to respond to and deal with any allegations. Practically speaking, the legal discourse was 
clearly discriminating against those with an inherent ‘historic disadvantage’ as well as 
condoning the power imbalance between the parties. But in overruling Stubbings, Lord 
Hoffman in Hoare delivered the lead opinion criticising the panel for deciding the case ‘as if 
the 1954 Act had just been passed’ and pointing out that, by way of a model, the Australian 
High Court had declined to follow it.69  
 
Hoffman dismissed the ‘systematically negligent’ requirement suggesting that future 
claimants should instead rely on vicarious liability.70 Other aspects corrected in his reasoning 
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would appear to be in line with feminist scholarship. However, feminist responses would be 
dissatisfied with the continuing limitations on the interpretation of what constitutes ‘significant 
injury’. Thus under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in the context of child sexual abuse: 
‘an injury is significant’ only if ‘the person whose date of knowledge is in question would 
reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings.’ Yet 
young children may not realise that their abuse is ‘sufficiently serious’; they are also unlikely 
to appreciate the need to, and implications of, ‘instituting proceedings.’ While the provision 
allows both actual knowledge ‘observed by’ the claimant and constructive knowledge such 
as medical and paediatric expertise to be taken into account, the section remains vague as 
to whether individual characteristics caused by the abusive behaviour could be considered. 
Moreover, the judiciary over-complicated the test of whether a reasonable person with that 
knowledge would consider the injury sufficiently serious making it partly objective and partly 
subjective.71  
 
Bender’s position on the ‘injured parties’ would be clear; that they are not only ‘burdened by 
the pain, injustice, and disruptions caused by their injuries, but they also are tangled in a 
legal system which is unfamiliar, alienating and ritualized’.72 Therefore what constitutes 
‘reasonableness’ needs to be more generously and flexibly interpreted, paralleling Hoffman’s 
conclusion that a claimant’s injuries would be established as a ‘significant injury’ where he 
was ‘obviously aware that he had been seriously assaulted’, either at the time or realised 
such years later.73 Lady Hale admitted that she found the provision more difficult to construe 
but ‘despite my nagging doubts’ fully supported Lord Hoffman’s ‘more generous approach to 
the exercise of discretion.’74 Lord Brown acknowledged their Lordships were ‘ushering in’ a 
‘new era’ and with it the likelihood of more sexual abuse claims.75 The ruling was followed in 
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Raggett and B v Nugent Care Society concerning three test cases in respect of a group 
litigation comprising 60 claimants who had been sexually abused in the 1960s and 1970s at 
two residential Catholic schools.76 The Court of Appeal in Nugent issued guidance on the 
correct approach in applying section 33 of the Limitation Act post-Hoare. First, the claimant 
need only show that the alleged abuse occurred and caused the alleged psychological or 
physical damage and that the defendant was vicariously liable for it. Second, the question of 
whether the claimant could reasonably have been expected to institute proceedings is to be 
determined by the judge under section 33, whereas pre-Hoare it had only been treated as 
relevant to the claimant’s knowledge and not to the exercise of the discretion. 
 
These discussions on the moral responsibility of Roman Catholic parish priests and teachers 
for their congregations and pupils, and the legal responsibility of their parent (employing) 
Church, have been rehearsed at length. This is because they represent the extent to which 
the Roman Catholic Church in the UK has been forced by the courts into accepting its legal 
responsibility for the actions of its ‘employees’. The decision in The Catholic Child Welfare 
Society 77 case has gone a considerable way towards reflecting a measure of divergence 
from a traditionally rigid doctrine on vicarious liability in relation to the Roman Catholic 
Church. To date, it has only been the Roman Catholic Church which has been required to 
take responsibility via the doctrines of vicarious liability, for the tortious actions of their clergy 
and associated agents. 
 
4 Responsibility and Religious Institutions 
In relation to ‘responsibility’ Bender makes a clear distinction between corporate and 
individual liability. Corporate liability should relate to the harms caused vicariously whereas 
personal responsibility must ‘correlate with the power of individuals’ and their authority to 
‘make decisions about resources, markets, personnel, and safety, as well as power to 
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disclose.’78 The Roman Catholic Church has significant power and authoritative 
responsibility to make decisions about its personnel and the safety of those under their care 
and it is on these grounds that courts have agreed that it must be held accountable. 
However, there can be no assumption that, in England, the Anglican Church is equally 
vulnerable. It might be thought unlikely, following Lord Phillips’ exposition of policy, that the 
quirks of theology and the arcane complexity of the Anglican Church’s legal position will 
continue to challenge the ability of the courts to establish vicarious liability against the 
institution in England should a claim be brought against it. Yet even in the post-CCW 
environment in England, it is likely to be more than just a matter of time before or if the 
current apparent impunity of that Church changes. A recent judgment has suggested that it 
remains difficult to establish a traditional employment relationship for Protestant churches 
generally.79  
 
Despite its position as the Established Church, the Church of England is not a single legal 
entity. Equally, Anglican parochial clergy are not employees, but office holders and the right 
of appointment to an office does not automatically lie with the Church hierarchy and often 
still lies with the (secular) patron of an individual living. Their rights and duties as office 
holders are regulated not by an employment contract but by the laws relating to the office 
held: independent of the individual holding it.80 As clarified in Sharpe v Worcester Diocesan 
Board of Finance & Another the position of a rector in relation to his diocese or the over-
arching body of the Church of England is, under ecclesiastical law, very distinctly not that of 
an employee.81 The Church can and does issue guidance to incumbents on how to perform 
the duties of their office satisfactorily according to current expectations, but even the 
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Bishop’s Papers cannot be held to amount to any form of employment contract as it is within 
the rights of Anglican clergy to decline to follow the advice on policy expressed in them.82   
 
The position in ecclesiastical and employment law is that where a senior cleric has power 
over an individual cleric, it relates only to their spiritual authority as clerics. Using that 
spiritual authority, under ecclesiastical law, a cleric may be defrocked for conduct 
unbecoming to a cleric in holy orders. That sanction has been rarely used. Instead, the 
Anglican Church in England has preferred to resort to removing an individual’s licence to 
officiate and preach at any service outside their own parish, either permanently or for a 
period of years.83 The Church has very recently shown itself reluctant to apply that remedy to 
its clergy even after conviction on charges of sexual abuse. Most recently, a furore has 
arisen over Reverend Guy Bennett, formerly Rector of Oxted and Tandrige, convicted in 
1999 on charges of indecent assault against young girls.84 He was, that year, deprived of his 
licence to hold office in the Church, but has not been defrocked. In October 2014, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to one of Bennett’s victims, outraged that he was attending 
church in East Grinstead, Sussex, regretting that it was not possible to stop anyone from 
wearing a dog-collar or using the honorific Reverend, so long as there was no illegal purpose 
in so doing. He added that having taken advice, it was also his conclusion that he ‘did not 
have the powers to depose Bennett from clerical orders’.85  
  
There is also the complication of the issue of the unique financial position of the Church of 
England as the state church in England. As office holders, clergy are in receipt of stipends 
provided by the Central Stipends Authority, run by the Church Commissioners. The Church 
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Commissioners were established by Parliament through the Church Commissioners 
Measure 1947, as an independent secular statutory body with responsibility for managing 
the Church’s assets and finances. The objective was to ensure that the Church would not 
become a burden on tax-payers, but in practice, the senior ecclesiastical hierarchy of the 
Church does not have the power to manage its finances without the agreement of the 
Church Commissioners, as attempts to persuade the Commissioners to invest ‘ethically’ 
underline.86  
 
Such legal ambiguities surrounding the position of the Anglican Church in England perhaps 
helps to explain why the conviction (along with his organist) in April 2013 of Reverend Keith 
Wilkie Denford, formerly parish priest at St John the Evangelist, Burgess Hill, on three 
charges of indecent assaults on boys under 16 has not been followed up by any broader 
claim against the Church of England. Instead, public reportage of the case has sought to 
emphasise that the Diocese of Chichester had taken pains to act properly and promptly once 
it learned officially of the abuse.87 In response to media questioning about the diocesan 
response, the Bishop, Martin Warner, has pointed out that reportage of the abuse by one of 
the victims had only been made in 2011. At that point the Diocese had been swift to involve 
the police and to aid them in developing the case for prosecution.88  
 
Even in the Anglican Church of Australia, where the position of clerics is less complicated by 
such arcane laws dating back to the time of the Church’s establishment in the sixteenth 
century, there have not yet been successful claims against it for vicarious liability in sexual 
abuse cases.89 But it has at least shown itself willing to act (if as discreetly as possible) to 
defrock those found guilty of sexual abuse of children. As a result of amendments to its 
canon law, Church Discipline Ordinance 2006, and the Holy Orders, Relinquishment and 
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Deposition Canon 2004, it is even reported to be planning to laicise a former Bishop, Keith 
Slater, for failing to take action on incidents of abuse by clergy within his diocese.90 This may 
provide a model which the Anglican Church in England might be wise to follow, in terms of 
maintaining a genuine spiritual authority rooted in a popular conviction that the Church takes 
seriously its moral duties of care, even though as at the time of writing there are still no 
instances of successful vicarious liability claims.   
 
5 Compensation 
The practice of compensating in monetary terms for damage and hurt done according to a 
sliding financial scale is long-established.91 The CCW judgment certainly reflects that, in line 
with Lord Phillips’ policy reasoning, ‘the employer, by employing the employee to carry on 
the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed by the employee’,92 as reaffirming 
that direction. While there are times when purely financial compensation is important, 
modern appreciations of the value of the individual and the importance placed on 
emotionally sensitive responses by the courts are likely to make it more difficult for those 
seeking compensation to accept it solely in the form of a financial restitution.  
 
While victims, such as those discussed previously in this article, have expressed a desire for 
apologies, some distrust remains about the genuineness of those offered by the Christian 
churches. What alternative reparation might be acceptable, either instead of or 
accompanying financial compensation? Bender suggests a way forward would be for 
common law tort theory ‘to acknowledge that financial responsibility alone is inadequate for 
legal responsibility’ and that instead it must ‘imagine another medium of value’ which 
amounts to a ‘recognition that injury is an emotional, physical, and spiritual event’.93 She 
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asserts that a feminist voice of responsibility, which includes emotional, caregiving work, has 
not been readily translatable into money, so tort law has basically ignored it. She further 
advocates a reappraisal of the conceptualisation of injury to include recognition that injury is 
an emotional, physical, and spiritual event.94  
 
The importance of an apology accompanying a successful vicarious liability against the 
Roman Catholic Church has already been mentioned, as has been the willingness of the 
Church of England to apologise, at least broadly and generically, for sexual abuse by 
Anglican clergy in the UK.95 Yet as Nick Smith has pointed out, the issue of remorse for 
crimes and wrongdoing, and apologies ordered by law, sets up a series of complex issues, 
at least partly because so much of the moral origins of English law lie within canon and 
ecclesiastical law.96 An expectation of the expression of contrition for individual wrong-doing 
is a core element in the rituals of the Christian churches, as the General Confession in the 
Book of Common Prayer has underlined for Anglicans who are required to state publicly that 
they had ‘offended against thy holy laws’ by having (amongst other things) ‘done those 
things which we ought not to have done’.97 To gain absolution from sins, genuine remorse 
was required, largely testified to by the public nature of the confession of sins.  
 
Given this background, the force of apologies from the Church of England, expressed by its 
senior clerics does have value. As well as echoing restorative justice thinking about the need 
for public justice to involve harm vindication, it is also in line with Bender and Honore’s 
requirement that redress should, to amount to justice, involve an acknowledgement and 
affirmation of the fact of individual suffering as a result of child sexual abuse in order to 
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provide the necessary ‘sensitivity to the experiences of the parties.’98 A change to Church 
ordinances to permit an easier laicisation of clerical abusers could, in practice, be the most 
practical way forward for the Church of England to show at least a moral, if not a legal, 
appreciation of a vicarious liability for its vicars. 
 
Conclusion 
This discussion has demonstrated that, in the wake of the high profile clerical abuse cases 
discussed here, the English courts are responding positively to the challenges posed by 
feminist scholarship. In line with that scholarship, what the legal thinking surrounding the 
issue of vicarious liability has begun to show is a recognition that, because the matter 
involves a breach of trust by men with a duty of care for the souls, rather than simply the 
bodies, of victims, financial compensation has not been seen as sufficient recompense by 
many claimants. In expanding its thinking to reflect some of the approaches intrinsic to 
restorative justice, the law is recognising the importance of the wider social and institutional 
context in its decisions. This has, most recently, been shown in the High Court decision in 
the case of A v Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, where the Society was held vicariously 
liable in a case of child sexual abuse.99 Though not strictly constituted a Christian Church 
analogous to the Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian and Unitarian Churches, the Society does 
make claims to a similar moral status, making the decision relevant here. 
 
The ability for the civil law to provide a remedy, albeit imperfectly if seen solely in terms of 
financial redress, is capable of producing accountability at a higher level. If tortious liability is 
about corrective justice, and a component of that correction is rooted in an enterprise-risk 
policy imperative, it is not difficult to see how an organised Church is now subject to greater 
and more transparent risk management obligations. However, it is not necessarily the case 
that the Church of England would so qualify; something underlined by the ongoing omission 
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by Synod in July 2015 of any suggestion of planning for financial compensation to be paid by 
the Church in clergy abuse cases.100 Given this, what alternative reparation can be 
appropriate? The Church of England has only accepted a moral liability for abuse 
perpetrated by clergy belonging to them. Beyond that, for reasons to do with its complex and 
arcane legal position, the Church as an institution has not yet received an equivalent scrutiny 
of the courts in relation to vicarious liability. The potential for a challenge to its impunity 
remains, not only through revelations by the Goddard enquiry101 into child abuse by UK 
institutions which will include the Church of England, but more immediately with the 
forthcoming trial (currently scheduled for October 2015) of the retired Bishop of Gloucester. 
Peter Ball is charged both with child sexual abuse and misconduct in public office, possible 
because of his Episcopal role which places him in a different position to parish clergy.102 
Though he may, in the end, be found unfit to plead, it is likely that, echoing the decision in 
the Lord Janner case, a decision will be made to proceed with a hearing of facts at least on 
the abuse charges.  
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